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REASONING MANIA: ITS MEDICAL AND MEDICO-LEGAL RELATIONS; WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CASE OF CHARLES. J. GUTEAU.

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ALTHOUGH it is scarcely possible that so well-marked a mental disorder as that which forms the subject of this paper could have escaped the notice of the earlier observers, no distinct account of it appeared till Pinel,¹ in 1801, published the first edition of his remarkable work. Under the head of "Mania without Delirium" he gave excellent accounts of several cases, and then, in a few words, summed up his description of the affection. "It may," he says, "be continuous or characterized by the occurrence of periodical accessions. There is no marked change in the functions of the understanding, the perception, the judgment, the imagination, the memory, etc., but perversion of the emotional faculties and blind impulsions to the perpetration of acts of violence, or even of sanguinary fury, without its being

¹ *Traité médico-philosophique sur l'aliénation mentale*, Paris, An. ix, p. 155.

possible to recognize the existence of any dominant idea or any illusion of the imagination to which the acts in question can be ascribed."

In the second edition, published in 1809, he treats more fully of the subject.

"We know that one of the varieties of insanity, called in the asylums reasoning mania, is especially characterized by the most marked coherence of ideas and correctness of judgment. The lunatic reads, writes, reflects as though he enjoyed his normal reason, and yet he is liable at any time to perpetrate some act of violence."

Further on he says, speaking of these cases :

"The lunatic makes the most correct answers to the questions addressed to him without the least incoherence of ideas being noticed."

He gives the following instance :

"A badly directed or neglected education, or rather a perverse and undisciplined nature, produces the first symptoms of this species of mental alienation. An only son of a weak and yielding mother was indulged in every whim and caprice which an irritative and violent temper could suggest. The violence of his disposition increased with his years, and the unlimited amount of money with which he was supplied removed all obstacles to the gratification of his desires. If resisted, he became furiously angry and attacked his adversary with ferocity. He was, therefore, continually embroiled in disputes and quarrels. If a sheep, a dog, a horse, or any other animal offended him he immediately killed it. If he went to any public meeting he was certain to come away bruised and bleeding from the blows he had received in the quarrels he excited. On the other hand, when he arrived at manhood, he came into the possession of a large property which he managed with discretion, performing all his duties to society, and even indulging in

some acts of benevolence. Wounds, law-suits, and heavy fines were generally the consequences of his numerous disputes. Finally, an act of especial violence put an end to his career. Enraged at a woman who had used abusive language to him, he seized her and threw her into a well. He was arrested and tried, and, on the testimony of many persons acquainted with his character and furious deportment, he was adjudged to be insane, and was committed to the Bicêtre for life."

Yet although Pinel had some idea of the affection under consideration, he did not have a very exact conception of it. He seemed to be under the impression that a tendency to the perpetration of unwarrantable acts of violence is its most marked feature, whereas we know very well that such acts are often done by its subjects after very thorough deliberation and from what are deemed ample motives.

Esquirol,¹ under the designation of "Reasoning Monomania," describes the disorder more accurately. He says:

"In reasoning monomania the patients are active, continually in motion, speaking a good deal, and with vivacity. They were good-tempered, frank, and generous; they have become peevish, deceitful, and wicked; they were affectionate and kind to their relations and friends; they have become discontented and abusive of those they once loved; from having been economical they are changed to spend-thrifts; their actions were reasonable and right; they are now inconsiderate, venturesome, and even reprehensible; their conduct, which once was in accordance with their social position, has become incongruous and at variance with their position and their means. They are guided entirely by their own wishes; but by their bearing and their conversation these people impose on those who have had no previous acquaintance with them, or who only see them occasion-

¹ Des maladies mentales, etc., t. i, p. 355, Paris, 1838.

ally, so well do they know how to restrain themselves and to dissimulate their real feelings."

The younger Pinel¹ had a still clearer though yet not an exact idea of reasoning mania. The subjects of it, he says, "are turbulent, indocile, quick to anger, committing outrageous acts, which they are always ready to justify by plausible reasons, and who are to their families, their kindred, and their friends constant subjects of anxiety and grief. They are continually doing wrong, either by neglect, by malice, or by wickedness. Incapable of mental or physical application, they destroy and subvert and unsettle every thing with which they are brought into contact and which they can injure."

Pinel calls the affection "Mania of Character," although he appears not to regard it as exactly insanity properly so called. In this opinion he is very evidently inconsistent with himself.

Speaking of the subjects of the disorder in question, Morel² says:

"Some have great ambition and pride, and consider themselves as being destined to the performance of acts of momentous importance. No consequence, however absurd, to which their insanity leads them shakes their confidence in themselves. Others are impelled by bad tendencies to the perpetration of the most extravagant or monstrous acts. They rebel against all family and social obligations and duties, and are constantly considering themselves the victims of misunderstanding or injustice. For the persecution of which they imagine themselves the subjects they seek to revenge themselves on their relations, their friends, and the world at large by making a parade of their immoral conduct, thinking to compromise the interests of those who ought to be

¹ *Traité de pathologie cérébrale*, Paris, 1844, p. 330.

² *Traité des maladies mentales*, Paris, 1860, p. 546.

dear to them by the shameful exhibition of their depravity. They go into the streets and other public places in a filthy and ragged condition. They let their hair grow, and endeavor to attract attention by all kinds of ridiculous and improper acts. Others apply their brilliant intellectual faculties, notwithstanding the fact that they are marked by an irregularity and incoherence of action, to the production of literary works, of which the extent and the plan exceed the limit that it is possible for human power to reach. These works are often in their teachings contrary to public morality and feeling. They are dreamers, utopians, false guides, who, in their mental conceptions and in the results of their intelligence and imagination, exhibit the same eccentricity, the same shamelessness as in their acts."

Dagonet¹ says of them, under the head of "Reasoning Mania."

"Left to themselves they are led by the most contradictory considerations. The first sudden impression, an idea occurring by chance, an accidental circumstance, influences them and becomes the point of departure for their conduct. There is with them not only a considerable amount of irritability and, thus to say, a furnace ready to be kindled, but, in addition, they are habitually dominated by impulses of various kinds. They follow blindly the passionate instincts which trivial circumstances are constantly provoking. Sexual desires, jealousy, ambition, vengeance, influence them at every moment of their lives, and, notwithstanding their wishes, prompt them to the commission of acts to be subsequently regretted. With the best intentions the individual cannot subdue himself or stop his headlong descent along the fatal declivity which leads to disorder.

¹ Nouveau traité élémentaire et pratique des maladies mentales, Paris, 1876, p. 202.

“In the institutions to which they may be committed they incite the patients against each other and urge them to acts of insubordination. They take pleasure in wearying the attendants with their complaints, and never cease their animadversions on the directions or advice given them. The most odious sentiments, suspicion, malevolence, and calumny, are the elements in which they live, and without which they could not exist.”

I have quoted thus extensively from other authorities in order to present at the beginning some idea of the characteristics of reasoning mania, as well as to show that such a mental disorder is well recognized by medico-psychological writers. I have confined my citations to French writers, for the reason that the affection was first differentiated by alienists of that country; but I might have drawn fully as largely from English and German writers. Indeed Prichard, Connolly, Bucknill, and Maudsley among the former, and Hoffbauer, Caspar, Griesinger, Liman, and Kraft-Ebing, and others of the latter, have written quite as strongly in support of the actuality of the affection in question as those I have cited. In this country the most distinguished authority in the affirmative is Dr. Isaac Ray.

Before proceeding to the consideration of the medico-legal relations of reasoning mania, it will be well to give a somewhat systematic description of the affection as it has been portrayed by others and as I have observed it in my own experience.

The most prominent characteristic of the disease is an overbearing egotism, which shows itself on all, even the most unimportant occasions. The individual without social position, without wealth, and without political influence conceives that he has only to make his wishes known to those in authority to have them granted. He does not hesitate to push himself forward as an applicant for high office,

and this when he has no one qualification fitting him for the position he seeks; refusals do not dismay him, the most pointed rebuffs do not abash him. He is sure that his application will be favorably considered, and any little act of common politeness that may be shown him is at once construed into a promise of assistance. He is invariably sure his appointment is about to be made, and when, as always happens, some other person is selected his chagrin is of short duration. He has some plausible excuse for his failure, and at once directs all his energies toward another and perhaps still higher position.

It may be said that these are the characteristics of all office-seekers, but this I emphatically deny. We have in this country ample opportunity to study the natural history of the class in question, and I think all who hear me will bear me out in the assertion that it is the rarest thing in the world to find a person applying for an office for which he is totally unfit, and for which he could not obtain the indorsement of any intelligent person.

Not long since a young man was under my professional charge who for several years had been a source of great anxiety to his friends on account of his vagaries and general impracticability. His father had a large shoe factory, and the attempt was made to instruct him in the details of the business. It was found, however, impossible to make him give his attention to the subject. He was firmly convinced that Nature intended him for something better than a shoemaker, and he destroyed a good deal of valuable property, leather, tools, etc., in order to induce his father to abandon the project. Finally he succeeded.

He had received a tolerably good education in the branches usually taught in the public schools, and was, moreover, exceedingly quick in his perceptions of things which he desired to understand. As he told me the story

of what he considered to be the wrong done him by his father in trying to make a shoemaker of him, he reasoned with great plausibility, and tears came into his eyes as he detailed the story of the indignity which had been attempted to be put upon him. "The fact is," said he "that when I went to school I paid great attention to the study of languages. Now, if I had known that I was going to be a shoemaker I would have turned my attention to the study of the human foot, and then I should have been qualified to make the best shoes this country has ever seen. I have thought over the matter, and to-morrow I am going to Washington to ask the President to appoint me a Commissioner of Emigration, and send me to all the nations of Europe to see after the emigrants and instruct them in their duties as American citizens. I shall give lectures on the subject in all the principal cities of Great Britain, France, and Germany."

"But," said I, "do you speak French?"

"Well, I studied French; I can't say I speak it, but I can learn it on the way over."

"You understand German?"

"No, but as soon as I am in Germany I shall go to a private family to board and I will soon pick up that language."

"Do you know any thing of political economy?"

"That is not essential. Emigrants do not require a knowledge of that science."

"Now won't you tell me your idea of the duties of an American citizen in which you are going to instruct these people?"

"I shall simply hand them the Constitution of the United States in their own language and then distribute copies of it among them. That paper," he continued, "contains the germs of all that a citizen requires to know."

"But," I remarked, "there is not a word in the Constitution about the duties of citizens. It relates to quite different matters."

"Nothing about the duties of citizens in the Constitution! Well, then, I'll supply the omission; I'll make it right; I know just what I'm about, and I'm just the man for the place."

He drew up his application, went round among prominent persons asking for letters of recommendation, and though he did not get a single one, he proceeded to Washington and sought an interview with the President. His father, however, followed him, but could not bring him home without the assistance of the police. He is now an applicant for the command of an ocean steamship.

The intense egotism of these persons makes them utterly regardless of the feelings and rights of others. Everybody and every thing must give way to them. Their comfort and convenience are to be secured though every one else is made uncomfortable or unhappy, and sometimes they display positive cruelty in their treatment of persons who come in contact with them. This tendency is especially seen in their relations with the lower animals.

Another manifestation of their intense personality is their entire lack of appreciation of kindness done them or benefits of which they have been the recipients. They look upon these as so many rights to which they are justly entitled, and which in the bestowal are more serviceable to the giver than to the receiver. They are hence ungrateful and abusive to those who have served them, and insolent, arrogant, and shamelessly hardened in their conduct toward them.

At the same time if advantages are yet to be gained they are sycophantic to nauseousness in their deportment toward those from whom the favors are to come.

The egotism of these people is unmarked by the least trace of modesty in obtruding themselves and their assumed good qualities upon the public at every opportunity. They boast of their genius, their righteousness, their goodness of heart, their high sense of honor, their learning, and other qualities and acquirements, and this when they are perfectly aware that they are commonplace, irreligious, cruel, and vindictive, utterly devoid of every chivalrous feeling, and saturated with ignorance. They know that in their rantings they are attempting to impose upon those whom they address, and will even subsequently brag of their success, as I have had them do to me.

It is no uncommon thing for the reasoning maniac, still influenced by his supreme egotism and desire for notoriety, to attempt the part of the reformer. Generally he selects a practice or custom in which there really is no abuse. His energy and the logical manner in which he presents his views, based as they often are on cases and statistics, impose on many worthy people, who eagerly adopt him as a genuine overthrower of a vicious or degrading measure. But sensible persons soon perceive that there is no sincerity in his conduct, that he cares nothing whatever for the cause he is advocating, that his cases and statistics are forged or intentionally misconstrued for the direct purpose of deceiving; in short, that the philanthropy or morality which he affects is assumed for the occasion. Even when his hypocrisy and falsehood are exposed he continues his attempts at imposition, and even when the strong arm of the law is laid upon him prates of the ingratitude of those he has been endeavoring to assist, and of the disinterestedness and purity of his own motives. Many of those who hear me will call to mind a recent notable case in point, in regard to which the public was enlightened through the agency of one of the daily newspapers. Indeed several

contemporaneous instances will doubtless readily be brought to mind.

Again, the reasoning maniac, as Campagne¹ says, may go still further in his career as a redresser of all kinds of possible and impossible wrongs, past, present, and future. "He displays in the performance of his part a degree of energy, activity, and caution which would be really admirable if his mission had any foundation whatever. Unfortunately his warfare is waged against windmills, and he takes for incontestible truth that which is altogether a figment of his imagination. Truth with him becomes error from the exaggeration, the depreciation, or the distortion to which it is submitted. He regards virtue through the medium of his own degraded passions, and never as it ought to be seen. Thus estimated it cannot direct him to any good purpose."

The subject of reasoning mania is always more influenced by the emotions than by the intellect. In fact he rarely judges calmly and dispassionately on any matter brought before him. The slightest cause produces in him an intense degree of excitement, and he manifests his emotional disturbance by loud exclamations, vehement gestures, and the most foul and abusive language against those who have incurred his resentment. But even when apparently most inflamed and in the very midst of his maledictions, he becomes, under the influence of some different circumstances, good-natured and smiling, and finishes his cursing with a joke or a hearty laugh. There is no depth or sincerity either in his imprecations or his blessings.

This facility for passing from one state of feeling to another, both of which may be manifested by all the char-

¹ *Traité de la manie raisonnante ; ouvrage couronné par la société médico-psychologique de Paris (Prix André, 1867), Paris, 1869, p. 98.*

acteristics of intense passionate perturbation, is a striking peculiarity of reasoning maniacs. Of all people in the world they seem to be most capable of "blowing hot and cold with the same breath." A patient of mine, a young man, would in my presence declaim in the most vehement manner against his father, accusing him of all the sins of the decalogue and of many others not found in that code, and in the next instant would declare that he was only trying to test his father's patience and forbearance, and that in reality no one could be kinder or more virtuous than he. But ere these latter opinions were fully expressed, I caught him making faces and shaking his fists at his father when his back was turned. It was impossible to get at his real feelings.

All authors have observed this symptom. Campagne¹ says of the reasoning maniacs:

"Passing without the slightest transition from one extreme to the other they felicitate themselves to-day of an event which they sneered at the night before. In the course of a single second they change their opinions of persons and things; novelty captivates and wearies them almost at the same instant. They sell for insignificant sums things they have just bought, in order to buy others, which in their turn will be subjected to like treatment; and, strange to say, before possessing these objects they covet them with a degree of ardor only equalled by the eagerness they exhibit to get rid of them as soon as they become their owners. To see, to desire, and to become indifferent are the three stages which follow each other with astonishing rapidity."

Although reasoning maniacs are not subject to morbid and irresistible impulses to commit motiveless crimes they are prone to acts of violence from slight exciting causes,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

and these may be perpetrated both in the heat of passion and after such deliberation as they are able to give to any matter. Generally they are directed against those who they suppose have injured them, and against former friends with whom they have quarrelled. Again, they may be committed solely for the purpose of gratifying the morbid feelings of pleasure which they experience at the sufferings of others. In the first category are embraced the many instances of arson, maiming, homicide, and other crimes in which the motive alleged has been so slight as to be ridiculous.

Thus, in the case of William Speirs,¹ who attempted to destroy by fire the State Lunatic Asylum at Utica, there was a motive, though a very insufficient one, for the act. On the fourteenth of July, 1857, the cupola of the institution was discovered to be on fire. The central building was almost entirely consumed before the flames were subdued. Four days afterward, in the afternoon, the store, barn, and stables were discovered to be on fire, and a man at the time was seen going from them. This man was William Speirs, who had been a patient in the asylum from 1850 to 1856, and then having been discharged by an order of a Justice of the Supreme Court had been employed up to the time of the fire as a messenger and otherwise. He had been committed to the asylum on the ground of insanity, after a trial for arson, so that he had perpetrated at least three separate acts of incendiarism. He confessed to both the attempts at Utica, and was committed for trial on the charge of arson.

At the trial it was shown, by his own confession, how and for what reasons he had set fire to the asylum. His motives were the facts that one of the assistants, Dr. Chapin, had sent him away from where they were making balloons and

¹ *American Journal of Insanity*, vol. xv, 1858-9, p. 200.

would not let him help, and that Dr. Gray, the superintendent, had taken away his keys. These acts made him angry.

It was also shown that Speirs had previously been in the lunatic asylum on Blackwell's Island ; that he had had a sunstroke ; that after that he would go out and stay whole days and nights, on one occasion remaining absent from home eight days, sleeping in wagons. During this period he went into a house and got some things and was going to set it on fire when he was discovered. He was tried and sent to the Blackwell's Island asylum. Then he came to the city and got some work at a saloon. "Did some depredation there," was tried and sent to the asylum at Utica. A sister was also insane and had been in an asylum. Drs. Day and Dering, of Utica, and Dr. M. H. Ranney, the superintendent of the Blackwell's Island asylum, testified to the insanity of the prisoner. The latter, under whose care Speirs had been, was very positive as to his insanity. "I discovered no delusion," he says ; "think he has no uncontrollable impulse ; I believe the act resulted from a perverted condition of the several moral faculties of the mind, with a propensity to burn buildings, and a feeble intellect. * * * * Perhaps any thing that would excite the prisoner would induce him to burn buildings, or even might stimulate him to commit an assault with intent to kill. I judge that he is a pyromaniac because he has committed these acts and is insane."

Drs. Gray, Cook, and Bell, however, testified to the sanity of the prisoner. The former stated that he had never believed him to be insane. We have seen, however that he was kept in the asylum under the charge of lunacy for six years. Speirs was convicted.

Joseph Brown,¹ as stated by Dr. Harlow, entered his own

¹ *American Journal of Insanity*, vol. xiii, 1856-7, p. 249.

house on the morning of the 16th of April, 1856, shortly after breakfast, where his wife, Annie Brown, was engaged with her domestic duties. Their little daughter, aged twelve, was also present. Brown went to his daughter, and taking out his wallet containing twenty dollars, gave it to her. On turning toward his wife, she kindly said to him: "Joseph, I am afraid of you," on which he immediately seized a long sharp knife with one hand and with the other threw her upon the floor; while in this position, lying upon her back, he cut her throat, severing the jugular vein, from which she shortly died.

It is stated that Brown at this time was about forty years of age, a member of the church, taking a prominent part in the religious exercises, and speaking loudly and vehemently. It was noticed, however, that his outside conduct did not comport well with his teaching. He indulged more or less in the use of stimulants. He was irritable and quarrelsome. His bad temper was particularly exhibited toward his wife, who was a feeble woman. He had been known to strike her with his fist and to kick her from a chair, and this though there had been no provocation. Subsequently he again, without cause, kicked her from the chair on which she was sitting, and struck her violently on the head with a pair of boots. On this occasion he left the house, but soon returned and gave his little daughter a piece of money. He was not intoxicated, and there had been no exciting conversation.

After this he frequently threatened his wife with assault, and she was obliged to flee from the house to escape him.

Immediately before the murder he had had a quarrel with his brother and tried to choke him. On being prevented, he laughed heartily and left the house. Shortly afterward he returned, and breaking open the door, threat-

ened the whole family with violence. After sufficiently alarming them, he ran away rapidly for several hundred feet.

He accused his wife of infidelity, but exhibited no indignation or excitement at the idea.

The day before the murder he went to Belfast, but before going, placed the following inscription on paper upon the door of his own house: "Farewell house, wife, and blessed little children." At Belfast he drank, as he said, a quart of gin. On Wednesday morning at 2 o'clock he left for home, and arrived there at about seven o'clock. Shortly afterward he committed the murder.

He then, after making two futile attempts to drown himself, was secured and lodged in prison.

Brown's grandfather was subject to fits of depression, and once nearly succeeded in cutting his throat. His grandmother lived to be over seventy, and during the later period of her life was demented and under the care of legal guardians. His mother was passionate and irritable, and her peculiarities were the subject of remark by the neighbors. An uncle was found drowned, and was supposed to have committed suicide. A brother had an attack of fever, which was followed by mental aberration.

At the trial, Dr. H. M. Harlow, superintendent of the insane hospital at Augusta, testified strongly in favor of the prisoner's insanity. He was, however, found guilty, and was sentenced to be hanged. Before the sentence could be executed he committed suicide by cutting his throat with a piece of glass; thus adding, as Dr. Harlow says, the capstone to the accumulation in favor of the prisoner's irresponsibility.

Hélène Jégado, a Frenchwoman, between the years 1853 and 1857 killed twenty-eight persons by poison, besides making several unsuccessful attempts. In none of her mur-

ders was any cause alleged or discovered, though undoubtedly the pleasure derived from the perpetration of crime was the chief factor. Her victims were her masters and mistresses, her fellow-servants, her friends, and several nuns, for whom in their last moments she displayed the utmost tenderness and care. The plea of monomania was set up in her defence, but no evidence of insanity was brought forward by her counsel save the apparent want of motive for her crimes. It was shown, however, that she had begun her career of crime when only seventeen years old, by attempting to poison her confessor ; that she had, while perpetrating her wholesale murders, affected the greatest piety, and was for a time an inmate of a convent ; that she had committed over thirty thefts ; that she had maliciously cut and burned various articles of clothing placed in her charge ; that when asked why she stole things that were of no use to her, she had replied, "I always steal when I am angry" ; that she was subject to alternate periods of great mental depression and excessive and unreasonable gaiety ; that she was affected with pains in the head and vertigo ; that when she was angry she vomited blood ; and that while in prison awaiting trial she was constantly laughing and joking about indifferent subjects. She was found guilty, and on being asked if she had any thing to say why sentence of death should not be passed, made an answer so much like one given more recently by another criminal that I give it here. "No, your honor, I am innocent. I am resigned to all that may happen. I would rather die innocent than live guilty. You have judged me, but God will judge you." Her last words on the scaffold were directed to accusing a woman as her instigator and accomplice, whose name was not even mentioned during the trial, and who, upon inquiry, was found to be an old paralytic whose life had been of the most exemplary character.

The case of Dumollard is in some respects similar to that of Hélène Jégado. This man, a peasant of a low order of intellect, but by no means an imbecile, was plunged in the lowest depths of ignorance and want. The moral sense appeared never to have been developed in him; he was a savage pure and simple; he was out of place among civilized people. This monster had a *penchant* for murdering servant-girls, whom he pretended to hire, and then conducting them to unfrequented places put them to death. Six thus disappeared, and nine others barely escaped. Indeed, it is probable that many more than these were murdered, for on searching his premises twelve hundred and fifty articles of women's apparel were found, of which only fifty were identified. Insanity was urged in his defence, but he was found guilty and executed. On the scaffold he behaved with the utmost insensibility. His last words were addressed to an officer, and were a request to tell his wife that a man, Berthet by name, owed him twenty-seven francs less a sou.

The most noted case of similar character occurring in this country is that of Jesse Pomeroy, the boy torturer and murderer of Massachusetts. The plea of insanity here was of some avail, for his sentence of death was commuted to imprisonment for life.

These cases are sufficient to illustrate the nature of the relations of reasoning mania to crime. They show also how slight may be the extraneous motive which prompts to the perpetration of criminal acts, and how strong is the innate feeling of personal gratification, born as it is of supreme selfishness, which leads in the same direction. Dr. Ray¹ has touched the exact point when he relates the following incident.

¹ A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, 5th edition, Boston, 1871, p. 223.

"I once asked a patient who was constantly saying or doing something to annoy or disturb others, while his intellect was apparently as free from delusion or any other impairment as ever, whether in committing his aggressive acts he felt constrained by an irresistible impulse contrary to his convictions of right, or was not aware at the moment that he was doing wrong. His reply should sink deeply into the hearts of those who legislate for, or sit in judgment on, the insane. 'I neither acted from an irresistible impulse, nor upon the belief that I was doing right; I knew perfectly well I was doing wrong, and I might have refrained if I had pleased; I did thus and so because I loved to do it; it gave me an indescribable pleasure to do wrong.'"

As Campagne says: "The intellectual power of reasoning maniacs is not great. Loquacious or unusually taciturn, heedless or morbidly cautious, dreamers, wearisome to all brought in contact with them, capricious and unmitigated liars, their qualities are often in a certain manner brilliant, but are entirely without solidity or depth. Sharpness and cunning are not often wanting, especially for little things and insignificant intrigues; ever armed with a lively imagination and quick comprehension they readily appropriate the ideas of others, developing or transforming them and giving them the stamp of their own individuality. But the creative force is not there, and they rarely possess enough mental vigor to get their own living.'

As to derangement of the intellect, I am quite sure, that though the emotions and the will are primarily and chiefly involved, there is more or less aberration of the purely intellectual faculties in every case. Certainly this has been so in every instance that has come under my observation. To a superficial examination the intellect may appear to be unaffected, as it very generally happens that there is an absence of marked delusion.

But a ready susceptibility to be impressed by slight exciting causes, an unquestioning faith in their own powers, when in reality these are far below the average, and an entire disregard of their duties and obligations and of the ordinary proprieties of life, are certainly indications of intellectual derangement. Most authors who have described the affection appear to think that it invariably exists without the participation of the intellect; others, perceiving that the intellect participates to some extent in all cases of mental derangement, refuse to admit the existence of reasoning mania. The question is a mere quibble—for whether the intellect is involved or not is by no means a matter of prime importance, and is resolved affirmatively or negatively according to the idea of what constitutes intellectual derangement, entertained by the disputants. In any event the reasoning maniac is, as Dr. Spitzka declared while on the witness-stand in the Guiteau trial, and as Campagne¹ said seventeen years ago, “a true moral monstrosity.”

Relative to the bodily peculiarities of reasoning maniacs, I have only space for the résumé of Campagne² as follows:

1. That the head is smaller than that of persons of sound mind.
2. That it is smaller than that of lunatics in general.
3. That as regards size it is about equal to that of persons of weak minds.
4. That it is larger than that of idiots.
5. That the antero-posterior curve, and particularly the posterior curve of the cranium are less than those of persons of sound mind, lunatics in general, the weak-minded, and even of idiots. It may be said that reasoning maniacs have a congenital atrophy of the posterior lobes of the brain, and that the cranium has been diminished in size to the detriment of the occipital region.

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 105.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 146.

And now to apply the foregoing remarks to the assassin of President Garfield. To do so fully would require me to traverse the whole record of the trial. But I scarcely think it is necessary to do this to get a definite opinion of the mental condition of the man now under sentence of death. We have only to take the hypothetical question proposed by the District Attorney, and which was answered by every one of the medical witnesses for the prosecution in positive language, that if the statements therein contained were true, the prisoner was sane. Let us see what these statements are:

That he had had several insane relatives; that while at college he abandoned his studies and entered the Oneida Community; that he left it and subsequently returned; that he again left it and went to New York to establish a newspaper devoted to the dissemination of peculiar religious ideas; that he abandoned this project; that he studied law and was admitted to the bar; that he was married and then divorced through his own procurement; that he became interested in religion and delivered lectures on the subject; that while thus engaged he attempted to strike his sister with an axe; that though a physician could find neither illusion, hallucination, nor delusion he pronounced him insane, "because of exaltation of the motives and explosions of emotional feeling, also excessive egotism, and that he was the subject of pseudo-religious feeling," and advised his confinement in a lunatic asylum; that he soon afterward gave up lecturing; that he associated himself with the National Republican Committee and prepared a speech which, however, he only delivered once; that after the election of General Garfield he asked by letter for the appointment of Minister to Austria; that he went to Washington to urge his claims; that not getting the position he applied for that of Consul to Paris; that he "earnestly and persistently followed up his application by verbal and written requests, having no special claims for this place except his own idea of the value of

his services," and having the recommendation of but one person; that he unwarrantably inferred from a remark of the Secretary of State that he might be appointed; that in spite of rebuffs from the officials in authority he continued to expect the appointment; that he made inquiries about a pistol which he subsequently purchased, borrowing money to pay for it; that he practised with it by shooting at a mark; that he followed the President on two occasions for the purpose of killing him, but was deterred, once because his wife, who was sick, was with him; that finally he lay in wait for him at the railway station, and shot at him twice, intending to kill him, and inflicting a mortal wound.

That after the shooting he attempted to get to the jail for protection; that he was arrested, and that a letter to General Sherman, asking for troops to protect him, was found upon his person; that in two letters written several days before the shooting, he declares the President's nomination was an act of God, that he has just shot the President, "that his election was an act of God, his removal an act of God"; that in another document addressed to the American people, and dated as early as June 16th, he used this language: "I conceived the idea of removing the President four weeks ago; I conceived the idea myself, and kept it to myself," and other words of like character.

That he subsequently claimed that he was inspired by the Deity to kill the President, and that he had had previous inspirations; that for years before the shooting he had procured a precarious living, not paying his board-bills, borrowing money, evading the payment of his railroad fares, retaining money collected by him as a lawyer, and being several times in prison on charges of fraud; and that on the stand he stated that he felt remorse for his deed so far as his personal feelings were concerned, but that his duty to the Lord and the American people was paramount.

On such a statement of facts, and with a knowledge of the

manner in which the prisoner conducted himself while being tried for his life, his abuse of his friends who were endeavoring to save him, his praise of judge and jury and opposing counsel at one time and his fierce denunciation of them at another, his speech in his defence, his entire lack of appreciation of the circumstances surrounding him, his evident misapprehension of the feelings of the people toward him, his belief in the intercession of prominent persons in his behalf and of his eventual triumph, and the many other indications with which you are all familiar, especially his conduct after sentence was pronounced,—I have no hesitation in asserting that Guiteau is the subject of reasoning mania, and hence a lunatic. There is not an asylum under the charge of any one of the medical experts for the prosecution that does not contain patients less insane than he.

What is to be done with such persons as Speirs the Utica incendiary, Brown the Maine wife-murderer, Jégado the poisoner, Dumollard the killer of servant-girls, Pomeroy the boy torturer, and Guiteau the assassin of the President? That all these people were lunatics I have no doubt; that all were fully worthy of the punishment awarded them I am quite sure. Ten years ago I wrote as follows:¹

“The only forms of insanity which, in my opinion, should absolve from responsibility and therefore from any other punishment except sequestration, are such a degree of idiocy, dementia, or mania, as prevents the individual understanding the nature and consequences of his act, or the existence of a delusion in regard to a matter of fact [not an inspiration or a command from the Diety, or any other incentive based solely on faith] which, if true, would justify his act. Persons suffering from either of these forms of mental derangement and perpetrating crimes should, in the

¹ *Insanity in its Relations to Crime: A Text and a Commentary*, New York, 1873, p. 73.

interest of the safety of society, be deprived of their liberty.

“But the individual who has sufficient intelligence to know that pointing a loaded pistol at a human being, cocking it, and pulling the trigger, are acts which will cause the death of the person against whom they are directed, should be subjected to the same punishment for a homicide as would be awarded for a like offence committed by a sane person. And the insane person whose delusions are not such as would, if true, justify a homicide, should come under the same rule.

And again, seven years ago, I said,¹ speaking of cases such as those now referred to :

“That individuals thus affected are insane, that is, of unhealthy minds, is undoubtedly true; but there is none the less any reason why, when convicted of crimes, they should not be made to suffer the full penalty which the law awards. There is no evidence to show that a crime committed through a morbid impulse, based upon a still more morbid emotion of pleasure, could not have been prevented had the individual chosen to combat the desire of self-gratification. Those morbidly constituted persons who commit crimes because it is pleasant for them to do so should be treated exactly like other offenders against the laws. The absence of motive is apparent only. The fact that the criminal experiences pleasure from the committal of the act is as strong a motive as any other that can be alleged, and is entitled to no more extenuating force than the pleasure of revenge or acquisitiveness or other passions. ‘Lord, how I do love thieving,’ said a London vagabond; ‘if I had all the riches of the world I would still be a thief.’ The plea, ‘I could not help it,’ is one which every member of the criminal classes can urge with as much force as the subject

¹ A Treatise on the Diseases of the Nervous System, sixth edition, 1876, p. 340.

of emotional morbid impulse, and when it stands alone in an otherwise sane individual should be absolutely disregarded by juries and judges."

In a paper on "Morbid Impulse," read before this Society May 28, 1874, I enunciated like views.

For this opinion I have been abused by certain ultra-humanitarians and emotional philosophers, who believe no doctrines and accept no statements that are not agreeable to them—the same class of people, in fact, who, during the President's suffering, slandered all who, looking at his condition through the medium of medical and surgical knowledge, were forced to the conclusion that recovery was almost out of the question. With such individuals black is white and white is black, according to the pleasure to be derived from either belief.

It is a source of satisfaction to me to find that the views which for nearly ten years past I have endeavored to promulgate have at last received practical endorsement by the conviction of Guiteau. The emotional philosophers, desiring him to be sane, still endeavor to persuade themselves that their wishes and facts are the same thing, and to the disgrace of American psychological medicine, they are sustained by certain physicians who appeared as witnesses for the prosecution. The charge of Judge Cox shows what *he* thought, and it is doubtless to his very emphatic declaration that insanity, unless of such an extent as to destroy the knowledge of right and wrong, or prevent the accused knowing the nature and consequences of his act, does not absolve from responsibility for crime, that a verdict of guilty was rendered.

The admirable charge of Chief Justice Davis of the New York Supreme Court, in the Coleman case, leaves nothing to be desired. "Emotional insanity," he says, "impulsive insanity, insanity of the will, or of the moral sense, all vanish into thin air whenever it appears that the accused party

knew the difference between right and wrong at the time and in respect of the act which he committed."

This is very different from the law as laid down by Judge Hogeboom in the case of Cole, tried for the murder of Hiscock. Here it was declared that "an insane impulse, leaving the mind incapable of exertion, holding the individual incapable of exercising his mind, so far as I have defined it to you, exempts him from responsibility, and if, under the influence of such a want of mind, the prisoner commits the act, whether you call it irresponsible impulse or any thing else, it exempts him from responsibility."

As I have endeavored to show quite recently,¹ there is no necessary connection between medical insanity and legal insanity.

Let Guiteau suffer the full legal penalty for his crime, but let him be executed with the distinct understanding that he is a lunatic deserving of punishment. To shut our eyes to his exact condition, and to try to flatter ourselves that he was of normally constituted mind when he shot the President, is not only cowardly but it is impolitic. The conviction and execution will be without the force of an example upon hundreds of others of unsound minds who may be contemplating the commission of crimes. And it will lead to the erroneous conclusion that there was a sane man, a man in the full possession of his mental faculties, capable of killing the President of the United States for the purpose of uniting the two wings of the Republican party, when both had never failed to show their contempt for the assassin whenever he had given them the opportunity. Was there ever a more insane motive than this, and was there ever a man whose whole career from childhood to the present day has afforded a more striking example of that form of mental derangement called reasoning mania?

¹ The Punishability of the Insane. *International Review*, November, 1881.